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Prospects For The Prevention Of Genocide
Kurt Jonassohn, June 2000.
(Paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science
Association on August 9, 2000 at Université Laval )
Among sociologists it has long been a part of their analysis of social processes that people's perceptions of the world are
shaped by their location in the social structure, i.e. by the groups to which they belong. In my introductory course that
abstract statement was succinctly explained by my professor (Everett C. Hughes) by pointing out that many doctors believe
the whole world to be sick and that policemen often think that everybody is a crook. This ilustrates that we al look at the
world from the particular vantage point at which we are located. So far this seems like a fairly simple idea that does not
require much explanation.
To make the link between such perceptions and their consequences it is useful to make a link between them and their effects
on situated actions. Such actions wil involve not only the actor but also others involved in the situation. It has been a truism
in sociology, ever since the work of Thomas and Znaniecki, that if people define a situation as real it is real in its
consequences. 
What makes an examination of people's perceptions of the world, and the way they define it, more complicated is the quite
obvious fact that we al belong to several groups. Complicated not only because of the diversity of groups to which we
belong, but also because these groups may have very different - perhaps even conflicting - effects on our perceptions. The
diversity of such groups may cover the gamut from family to occupation, from ethnicity to language and religion, and from
ideological to political and avocational groups. But since we al do belong to more than one group, an interesting question
arises: which groups have how much effect on the way we perceive the world?
These questions are not new. They are becoming topical again because they arise in connection with contemporary ideas
about (1) the one-world notion embodied in the United Nations and (2) the sudden importance of the global economy,
embodied in debates about the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and several other bodies involved with managing
the economy. These two sets of ideas clearly have an enormous influence. While, on first impression, one might think that
they complement each other, they often seem to lead to conflicting definitions of the world. As with al other views of the
world, one would like to know how they correspond to "reality" - however that is defined.
These remarks are not meant to introduce an exploration of that question. They have a more modest - though not less
important - purpose: to understand what happens to people and groups attempting to deal with gross human rights
violations and their potential for escalating into genocidal massacres. To what extent do they misunderstand the world
because their analysis is restricted by a conceptual world that they are unable to transcend? To what extent is that conceptual
world affected by pressures to conform to dominant world views and to observe the norms of political correctness?
These are daunting questions that I do not pretend to be able to answer; al that I want to present to you here are some
aspects or considerations that may help to pave the way to some answers.
An example of these processes is the recent preoccupation with the so-caled Y2K problem. Before the end of 1999 attention
was largely focused on the range of breakdowns and even catastrophes this problem would cause, how to prepare for these
anticipated emergencies, and how to prevent their occurrence. Hardly any attention was accorded to the reasons for these
anticipated consequences of the Y2K problem, although they certainly deserve inclusion in the final accounting. There seem
to be two possible reasons why this "problem" occurred at al. The first one is that within the "techie" community that designs
computing systems there is so little foresight that the quite certain arrival of the year 2000 never entered into their designs.
The second, even more cynical, reason is the realization that the very existence of that problem would produce enormous
wealth for those trying to prevent or fix it. My own view is that, in al likelihood, both reasons were operating; that is: first
there were the dummies who lacked the foresight to take account of the quite certain approach of the year 2000, and then
there were the sleazy types who discovered this omission but decided not to correct it because of the prospect of reaping vast
and undeserved profits. Finaly, as usual, the dire predictions turned out to be entirely off the mark. No serious breakdowns
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seem to have occurred beyond those that are reported on an almost daily basis. Even the fragile and out-dated systems
operating in poorer countries have survived the dire predictions that were heavily targeted on them. That leaves only one
question: Wil the computer industry attempt to rationalize what happened or wil they simply ignore it in the ful knowledge
of the public's defective memory for even quite recent events? (Since this was written the answer has become obvious.)
A more serious example may be cited from the quite complex relationships between the first world and the third world. (Does
anyone remember what constituted the second world?) After the end of the World War I, the first world initiated several
programs to assist with the development of the countries in the third world. Great resources have been devoted to these
programs without producing the anticipated results. One of the major reasons for these failures was the repeated insistence
of the rich countries to analyse the situation in their own terms rather than planning programs in terms of the situations and
the needs of the recipient countries. It seems that Western experts were unable or unwiling to define the needs of others
except in terms of their own experience. Thus, the first wave of post-World War I assistance to third world countries was
based on the quite simple-minded theory that these countries would recapitulate the same stages of industrialization as had
been experienced by the West -- except in much less time. 
When it became obvious that this theory was quite wrong a new group of experts developed a theory according to which a
developing country could succeed only by copying infrastructural and democratic institutions as they already existed in the
rich countries. These experts were so convinced of the truth of their parochial theory that they imposed adherence to it as a
condition for receiving loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Again, the accumulating evidence of
failure disproves the theory and fuels a new debate on the best way for the rich to assist the poor. This debate is unlikely to
lead anywhere until the rich learn to look to the poor to find out what the world looks like through their eyes. What
complicates matters is the ever-present question about hidden agendas. In this particular case suspicions have been voiced
about the extent to which assistance to the poor is undermined by the desire of the rich to become even richer. The costs
incurred by many of the poor countries in order to service their debts turn out to impoverish them further while enriching the
lenders.
Finaly, we come to the most important example of defining a situation in terms that may serve the aims of the definers but
do not contribute to an analysis of that situation. The second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by an
enormous increase in gross human rights violations, massacres, and genocides. The desire to prevent such events or to
intervene in their escalation is widely shared by the public and by many organizations. These noble intentions tend to be
undermined by a tendency to analyse events in terms of the observers' preconceived notions that are abetted by a wide
variety of managed information sources. The effects of misinformation and disinformation are difficult to sort out; they may
range from ignorance to the deliberate obscuring of the truth. Thus, the media, the politicians, and the scholars often agree
in locating the sources of conflict in colonialism, ethnicity, nationalism, and/or religion. These factors may play a role in a
particular situation; by themselves they may cause anything from mutual dislike to mutual isolation to hostility; but they are
neither necessary nor sufficient causes of violence and aggression.
Whatever the role of these factors, they are usualy cited while the pervasive effects of the search for greater power and for
increasing wealth is often ignored. These latter two factors are in a category by themselves because they have the unfortunate
characteristic that they are always satisfied at someone else's expense. By definition, the search for power and for wealth is
defined as a short-term process that inevitably produces victims. The perpetrators gain in power reduces the power of the
victims; their gain in wealth reduces the wealth of the victims proportionately. 
The United Nations, several regional associations, as wel as a number of international agreements are attempting to curb the
search for power. They have had a modest measure of success, but much remains to be done. One of the problems facing
those who are attempting to limit the search for power is the vexing issue of sovereignty. That issue has emerged as a major
dimension affecting the implementation of human rights agreements because the great majority of violations of these
agreements are committed within nation states. I wil not comment further on the role of power at this meeting of political
scientists who are the specialists in the study of power.
However, no national or international mechanisms have even been suggested to limit the drive for wealth. Any such
suggestion is perceived as an attack on capitalism and branded as a threat to its system. This is another dramatic effect of
mistaken perceptions. In reality, a greater spread of wealth to the poor would undoubtedly increase everybody's wealth. This
is true regardless of whether the units of analysis are poor countries or poor sectors of the populations of rich countries. Such
a raising of the standard of living of the poor would, of course, vastly increase consumption which, in turn, would increase
the wealth of the producers. That would hardly qualify as an attack on capitalism. Unfortunately, such a restructuring of the
distribution of wealth would inevitably require considerable time. However, the prevailing ethos in economic circles is
oriented toward instant results. The performance of economic institutions is assessed on a quarterly basis and longer-range
results are only rarely taken into consideration. 
As long as the deleterious effects of the drives for power and wealth are obscured by erroneous perceptions and mistaken
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definitions of situations and aggravated by a short-term time perspective, the prospects for preventing or reducing gross
violations of human rights and genocides remain poor. The strongest hope seems to lie in a spreading of popular protests to
such a level that they wil be impossible to ignore - at least in countries with a commitment to democracy.
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